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Shareholder remedies:
The Law Commission's final Report on 
Shareholder Remedies (Law Com 246, 
Cm 3769, October 1997) completes the 
task begun by their Consultation Paper 
(No. 142) of 1996. The central feature of 
the Law Commission's proposed reform 
of shareholder remedies is a new- 
statutory derivative action. The present 
commentator examined the impact of this 
remedy on public listed companies on the 
basis of the proposals and arguments 
presented in the Consultation Paper 
(Amicus Curiae, Issue 3, November 1997). 
The present comment looks at changes 
made in the final report and considers 
some wider implications of this important 
development in shareholder remedies.
ENFORCEMENT OF 
DIRECTORS' DUTIES
The final report affirms that the new 
derivative action it proposes is confined to 
the enforcement of directors' duties by 
minority shareholders. In that sense it is 
an inclusive remedy extending to the 
whole range of directors' duties. In 
certain respects, however, it has a 
narrower range than the traditional 
'common law' derivative action. The final 
report closes the door in respect of 
proceedings against wrongdoing majority 
shareholders. The Consultation Paper left 
open the possibility of using the new 
remedy against managers and officers who 
were not directors but on a more 
restrictive basis than in the case of 
proceedings against directors   essentially 
re-introducing the old concept of 'fraud 
on a minority'. The final report has wisely 
rejected this dual approach, but has 
adopted the questionable solution of 
excluding managers and officers from the 
new remedy. This may have significant 
implications for the successful 
deployment of the new remedy in the case 
of a public listed company, which is itself 
the top holding company of a large group. 
The final report also rejects any provision 
for multiple derivative actions (left open 
in the Consultation Paper). This will add 
to the problem, very obviously, where 
groups of companies are involved.
Confining the new derivative action to 
proceedings against directors still allows
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for those involved in their breaches of 
duty to be joined as defendants (e.g. 
where the remedies of tracing and 
constructive trusts are resorted to). The 
final report also establishes that 'director' 
includes 'shadow' and 'de facto' directors. 
The final report, on the other hand, 
establishes that minority shareholders 
may not intervene or commence 
proceedings against third parties (e.g. in 
tort) even if the board of directors 
breached their duty in refusing to take 
such proceedings. This still leaves the 
possibility of a derivative claim against the 
board itself for their possible breach of 
duty.
Where the company has a claim for 
breach of duty, the final report proposes 
that where the company fails diligently to 
pursue proceedings a shareholder may 
apply to continue, as a derivative action, 
proceedings commenced by the company. 
To do so it must be shown that the claim 
is capable of being pursued as a derivative 
action; the company has failed to 
prosecute the claim diligently; and the 
manner in which the company has 
commenced and continued the action 
amounts to an abuse of the process of the 
court.
IMPLEMENTATION OF 
REFORMS
An important innovation in the final 
report is to limit new legislation (a 
proposed s. 458A in the Companies Act 
1985) to the basic essentials of the new 
remedy. The detailed procedure for the 
application for leave to bring a derivative 
action is to be spelt out in rules of court 
(para. 6.16). This will clearly have the 
added advantage that it will shield the 
details of the proposed procedure from 
adverse attack when the main legislative 
provision is examined in Parliament. It 
may also allow judges to be more flexible 
in the application of the new procedure.
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
The final report emphasises that this 
will be subject to strict judicial control 
and what are called 'issues relevant to the 
grant of leave' (good faith, interests of the 
company etc.) largely confirm what was
contained in the Consultation Paper. 
There is, however, some clarification in 
respect of shareholder ratification. This 
remains (like the other issues) 'only a 
factor to which the court has regard'; but 
it is made clear that the fact that a wrong 
is ratifiable will not hinder a shareholder 
commencing proceedings (para. 6.84), 
actual ratification will still bar 
proceedings. But, in considering whether 
or not to grant leave, the court may 
adjourn proceedings to allow a meeting to 
be called for the purpose of ratification. 
The court may also use its discretion to 
refuse leave where it is clear that a wrong 
will be ratified and no purpose will be 
served in ordering this holding of ao o
meeting. A new factor introduced by the 
final report allows the court to take into 
account the fact that the company, in a 
general meeting, has resolved not too o'
pursue the cause of action. The report 
points out that this is not the same as 
ratification which has the effect of curing 
the wrong; but that it will bind the 
minority if made in good faith in what the 
majority consider is the benefit of the 
company (para. 6.87).
This hardening of policy (as between 
the Consultation Paper and the report) 
will be practice largely to take away the 
apparent availability of the new remedy to 
enforce the full range of director's duties 
  even though in principle they are all 
within its ambit. Actions for negligenceo o
(or for breaches of conflict of interest and 
duty) may, in rare situations, obtain leave. 
If, in the case of listed public companies, 
the institutional investors can be 
persuaded to refuse ratification (or 
oppose a resolution to suppress 
proceedings), then the new remedy may 
prove slightly more viable than its 
common law predecessor.
The real gain of the proposed remedy 
will, however, be in the area of fraudulent 
breaches of directors' duties that are not 
subject to ratification. Here it will provide 
a better approach than the existing law in 
'wrongdoer control'. This will be 
particularly evident in the case of public 
listed companies where 'de facto' control 
now causes such problems.
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On one important matter the 
Consultation Paper and the final report 
have very little to say. It is briefly assumed 
that the existing system for funding 
derivative suits (costs indemnity orders) is 
working perfectly well and should be left 
to itself. This is open to question. In the 
case of listed public companies the 
financial and informational barriers still 
remain formidable. Yet it is the case of 
such companies that the need to remove 
barriers to derivative litigation is most 
apparent. A recent development across 
the whole area of civil litigation seems to
o
come too late for the final report. The 
Lord Chancellor's recent proposal to 
replace legal aid with a new system of 
conditional fees raises very interesting 
possibilities. The Lord Chancellor's 
department has told this commentator 
that the system will include any civil 
proceedings the object of which is the 
recovery of money judgment. It will 
therefore include derivative proceedings. 
If this new system can be 'married' with 
the indemnity order already established, 
bright prospects (depending on your 
point of view) may be in prospect for the 
derivative action.
CONCLUSION
The Law Commission's aim in this 
report was above all to clarify the 
confusion in the existing law. The final
o
report observes (para. 6.9) that:
'... the introduction of a clear set of rules 
Jor the derivative action [based on Canadian 
and other Commonwealth models] in this 
country would Jollow the lead given in other 
jurisdictions. In an age of increasing 
globalisation of investment and growing 
international interest in corporate governance, 
greater transparency' in the requirements of a 
derivative action is in our view highly 
desirable'.
That cannot be doubted. However, it 
seems strange to this commentator (see 
Amicus Curiae, Issue 3, November 1997) 
for the Law Commission not even to refer 
to the applicable law in the leading 
member states of the European Union 
(especially Germany and France). 
Comparative law cannot surely be 
confined to the Commonwealth. Another 
surprising omission is any treatment of 
the conflict of laws in this area. The LU as 
an arena for civil litigation should have 
been borne in mind. The law of the EU
(which our courts must already apply) has 
an interesting provision in respect of 
jurisdiction over corporate proceedings 
and shareholders' actions. As to choice of 
law in derivative proceedings, the scant 
English authority deserved at least some 
attention. As with the refusal to consider 
substantive company law (most notably as 
regard to directors' duties) this can only 
be justified in terms of the narrow remit 
set by the Lord Chancellor's Department 
and the DTI. The Law Commission did 
not see itself as free to travel even slightly 
beyond this remit set out at the 
commencement of the final report (see 
paras, f.l and 1.3). @
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